

Community resources

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Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI451, INDIAN VIEWS ON ENGAGING IRAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NEWDELHI451.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09NEWDELHI451	2009-03-09 12:34	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN	Embassy New Delhi

Appears in these articles:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1539453.ece

VZCZCXRO3937  
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW  
DE RUEHNE #0451/01 0681234  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 091234Z MAR 09  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5711  
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7455  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6056  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3181  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6155  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8172  
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7708  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000451

SIPDIS

USDOE TOM CUTLER AND DANIEL COLOMBO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019  
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EPET IR IS PK IN  
SUBJECT: INDIAN VIEWS ON ENGAGING IRAN

REF: A. NEW DELHI 2986 B. NEW DELHI 2021 C. NEW DELHI 1310

Classified By: Acting POLCOUNS Lesslie Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: Indian experts on the Indo-Iranian relationship describe it as stable but somewhat shallow. It is nurtured by both sides simply.
2. (C) Comment: Much of India's Iran policy is designed for public consumption by the domestic Muslim and Non-Aligned Movement audience. We End Comment.

India-Iran Relations: Longstanding, Wide-Ranging

3. (C) The foundation of the Indo-Iranian relationship lies in the two countries' historical ties which, in a region that places so much importance on
4. (C) High level Indian and Iranian government officials meet regularly to discuss their countries' energy ties, naval agreements, international
5. (C) However, despite official proclamations in Tehran and Delhi that the Indo-Iranian relationship is longstanding, stable and substantial, the
- U.S. Should Engage Iran Bilaterally, Say Indian Experts

6. (C) In the last decade, India's desire to cultivate its

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relationship with the U.S. has factored into its foreign policy toward Iran. But India's ability to influence Iran on behalf of the U.S. is limited

7. (C) A third reason why Indians would prefer to stay out of U.S.-Iran relations is because India wants a stable relationship with Iran, and India Opposes Iran's Nuclear Weapon's Ambitions, for its Own Reasons

8. (C) Several of Post's contacts, both in and out of government, all of whom have served for extended periods in Iran, agree that Iran's nuclear
9. (C) When asked if the U.S. could continue to count on India opposing Iran's nuclear weapons development in fora such as the IAEA, Arora answered
10. (C) However, India would not oppose Iran simply to enhance its relationship with the U.S. or to improve relations with Europe, he explained
- Using India's Leverage to Engage Iran, Israel

11. (C) Despite the belief held by many here that using India as an intermediary for dealing with Iran is not plausible, a few Indo-Iran watchers
12. (C) Israeli cooperation with India has grown over the past decade. According to both Indian and Israeli press reports, Israel is overtaking

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Indo-Israeli relationship, while still relatively young, might be ripe enough to incorporate dimensions other than defense sales. According to the

IPI Pipeline, Railway Cited As Potential Growth Areas

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¶13. (C) India's priority for the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline project has been to obtain the guarantee that Iran w

¶14. (C) However, given the dual Indian interests of energy security and regional stability, contacts such as Bhadrakumar believe bringing the  
WHITE